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SMITH, Circuit Judge.  
 
 John Angell was found guilty by a jury of eleven counts of traveling for 
purposes of engaging in sex with a minor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b), and 
eleven counts of aggravated sexual abuse of a child in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
2241(c).  Angell timely appealed, claiming that:  (1)  the evidence was insufficient 
to support a conviction for any of the twenty-two counts;  and (2)  the District 
Court committed reversible error in omitting an element of § 2241(c) from its jury 
instructions.1  We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to convict on all 
counts, but that the omission of a § 2241(c) element must be corrected.  
Accordingly, we will affirm the § 2423(b) convictions, vacate the § 2241(c) 
convictions and remand for further proceedings. 
    Angell was hired by the victim’s father to drive the victim and his sister 
between their father’s house in Pennsylvania and their mother’s house in New 
                                                 
∗ This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
1 The District Court exercised jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We exercise 
appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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York.  Angell drove in this capacity for eight years and became very close with 
both children.  The Government alleged that Angell repeatedly abused the victim 
during trips his sister skipped.  The Government selected eleven particular trips for 
which it could establish that Angell was alone with the victim, and which took 
place well after the abuse allegedly began.  For each trip, the Government charged 
Angell with one count each of violating § 2423(b) and § 2241(c). 
I. 
 Angell does not dispute that there was sufficient evidence to find that he 
violated both statutes at some point – most notably, the Government introduced a 
tape of a call the victim made to Angell (as part of the FBI’s investigation) during 
which the two discussed their sexual relationship, at times referring to sex as “what 
happened in the Lexus.”   Rather, Angell argues that the evidence was insufficient 
to find that he did so on the particular dates attached to each count.  Viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, we conclude there was 
sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the abuse occurred on all of 
the dates in question.  See, e.g., United States v. Caraballo-Rodriguez, 726 F.3d 
418, 430 (3d Cir. 2013) (en banc). 
 The victim initially told investigators that Angell abused him “every time” 
they travelled alone together.  At trial the victim testified on direct examination 
that it happened “[p]robably, I think every time we were alone.”  On cross-
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examination he testified: “just about every time that [we] were in the car alone, 
something happened;” “I mean, I didn’t keep a record.  I’m not sure if it happened 
every single time,” and agreed that it “would be fair to say” that he was abused 
“most times” they were alone together.  Aside from establishing that Angell was 
alone with the victim on the dates charged in the indictment (in part by introducing 
EZ-Pass records from those dates which showed that Defendant’s trips on the PA 
Turnpike varied somewhat significantly in time) the Government offered no other 
evidence to tie the abuse to those dates. 
 “[I]t is the jury’s province (and not ours) to make credibility 
determinations.”  United States v. Richardson, 658 F.3d 333, 337 (3d Cir. 2011).  
The victim consistently testified that, at a minimum, he believed the abuse 
occurred every time they were alone together.  The jury was entitled to believe 
him, especially given the Government’s overwhelming evidence that abuse 
occurred.  In addition to the taped call with Angell, the Government introduced the 
testimony of an expert urologist who examined Angell and found that he had 
genital scarring consistent with a description given by the victim. 
 If the jury could conclude that the abuse occurred on all of the dates in 
question, it could certainly conclude that “a significant or motivating purpose” of 
the travel was to facilitate the abuse.  See United States v. Hayward, 359 F.3d 631, 
637–38 (3d Cir. 2004) (rejecting the argument that “the dominant” purpose of the 
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travel be related to the abuse).  That conclusion is not inconsistent with the fact 
that Angell also crossed state lines for the purpose of performing his job of 
transporting the victim between his parents’ houses.  
II. 
 Although an element of § 2241(c) is “performing or attempting to perform [a 
sexual] act,” United States v. King, 604 F.3d 125, 139 (3d Cir. 2010), the District 
Court omitted that element from the jury’s instructions.  Angell did not object at 
trial.  “Under the plain error test, before an appellate court can correct an error not 
raised at trial, there must be (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects 
substantial rights. If all three conditions are met, an appellate court may then 
exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the error seriously 
affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”  United 
States v. Haywood, 363 F.3d 200, 206–07 (3d Cir. 2004) (internal brackets 
omitted).  The Government concedes that the first two requirements are met.  
However it claims there was no prejudice because the evidence against Angell was 
overwhelming for all of the counts.  And even if it was not, the Government claims 
the evidence was overwhelming for at least one of the counts and therefore Angell 
would have received the same sentence, thus preserving the fairness, integrity, and 
public reputation of the proceedings.  We disagree with both contentions. 
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 The evidence that any misconduct occurred on all of the dates in question or 
even any particular date in question, while sufficient, was not overwhelming:  the 
victim did not testify with certainty and the EZ-Pass records indicated that it was 
unlikely Angell stopped on the turnpike (where some but not all of the abuse 
allegedly occurred) for long enough to abuse the victim on some of the dates.  See 
United States v. Dobson, 419 F.3d 231, 240 (3d Cir. 2005) (“To be sure, the 
Government presented evidence from which the jury could have concluded that 
Dobson knew of the fraudulent nature of the UL scheme. However, this does not 
preclude a finding of prejudice for purposes of plain error.”); Haywood, 363 F.3d 
at 207 (plain error cannot be ignored based on “[s]peculation about what the jury 
could have done if properly instructed”).  Even if we were inclined to agree with 
the Government that there was no unfairness, the public reputation of the 
proceedings would still be impugned.  See Dobson, 419 F.3d at 241 (“a conviction 
based on an incomplete charge taints the reputation of the judicial process”). 
III. 
 Accordingly, we will affirm the § 2423(b) convictions (Counts 1-11).  We 
will vacate the § 2241(c) convictions (Counts 12-22) and remand the case to the 
District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
